These empirical measures are then used by empirical researchers, who have provided
a series of facts about the correlates of inequality. Perhaps the most famous
relationship is the Kuznets (1955) curve shown in Figure 34.1. Income inequality first
rises and then falls as countries get richer. This c...
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Most studies of inequality focus on income, but inequality can also be calculated
based on wealth, consumption, or any other reasonable proxy for well-being.
Wealth or consumption have the advantage that they are less subject to shortterm
income shocks, and the inequality of lifetime earnings is pro...
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It is common to portray democratic capitalism as a system where markets allocate
income according to efficiency while governments redistribute income according to
political demand. This suggests a convenient intellectual division of labor between
economists and political scientists, but it is based...
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As we have seen, some of the literature has dealt with the complexity of democratic
politics by using highly simplifying model assumptions. The Meltzer–Richard model
is a prominent example. Such simplifications lead to clear and deductively valid
inferences, but they often come at a considerable c...
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As noted in the introduction, distributive politics is inherently multidimensional
because a pie can be divided along as many dimensions as there are political agents
vying for a piece. It is therefore hard to understand why politicians should constrain
themselves to contest a single policy instrume...
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Median voter models are very simple to use, but as the Robin Hood paradox suggests,
they do not provide much leverage on explaining the observed variance in
redistributive politics. Power resources theory points to one potential source of such
variation that has been subject to much research: govern...
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In a seminal article, Przeworski and Wallerstein (1982) give a simple answer to the
question of why the poor don’t soak the rich. Any attempt at radical redistribution, or
socialism, they argue, would be met by massive disinvestment and possibly violence
by the upper classes. So even if the poor w...
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Political factors within nations give rise to two basic types of pressures for—or
against—coordination and cooperation in the international arena. On the one hand,
exchange rate policies involve trade-offs with domestic distributional implications.
International coordination or cooperation may n...
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International monetary regimes tend toward one of two ideal types. The first is a
fixed rate system, in which currencies are tied to each other at publicly announced
rates. Some fixed rate systems involve a common link to a commodity such as gold
or silver; others peg to a national currency such as...
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Macroeconomic voting divides naturally into two main views defined by voters’ time
horizons: prospective and retrospective. In the prospective view, the expected future
relative performance of contestants for office is all that matters. Prospective valuation
is akin to the pricing of financial ass...
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Other empirical studies of RPT report more mixed results. Sheffrin (1989), for example,
finds US monetary cycles, but not significantly consistent with RPT in the USA or
elsewhere. Using over 100 years of American data, Klein (1996) finds political events
associated with ends of slumps and booms, co...
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Unlike the electoral cycles case, empirical support for partisan cycles seemed strong,
so no particular empirical puzzle motivated RE partisan theory. Rather, Alesina’s
(1987, 1988) rational partisan theory (RPT) filled theoretical needs, providing a framework
logically consistent with modern RE e...
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In partisan models of political economics, candidates contest and voters adjudicate
elections in partisan terms. Parties cultivate ties to different voter groups and nurture reputations for policy-making that favors those groups. Parties and voters value
these ties and reputations, so incumbents con...
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One component of context conditionality that is especially neglected in electoral cycle
studies is that of electoral challengers, who play little direct role in most models.
Higher-quality challengers, for instance, may lead incumbents to expect closer elections,
yielding greater electioneering in q...
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Viewing this evidentiary pattern, economists naturally questioned the adaptive expectations
and exploitable Phillips-curves assumptions. Voters and economic actors
can easily foresee elections and policy-makers’ incentives, so electoral cycles should not exist or should have no real effects under...
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